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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-2482

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICHARD M. LAKE,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-07-cr-00323-002)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 10, 2009
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 22, 2009 )

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Richard Lake (“Appellant”) and his co-conspirators were charged in a seventeen-

count indictment with conspiracy, armed bank robbery and a firearm offense. The
Appellant was named as a defendant in five of those seventeen counts and entered into a
plea agreement with the United States. In that agreement, the Appellant agreed to waive
his right to appeal any sentence imposed within the statutory maximum as well as his right
to appeal the manner in which that sentence was determined. Having now appealed his
sentence, the Appellant contends that the District Court erred in calculating that sentence.
We will enforce the waiver-of-appeal provision because we hold that the Appellant’s
agreement was knowing and voluntary and that imposition of sentence would not amount
to a miscarriage of justice. We will affirm.1
I.
The Appellant was charged with: (1) aiding and abetting the June 1, 2007, armed
robbery of the M&T Bank, a robbery that netted Lake and his co-conspirators
approximately $20,000; (2) aiding and abetting the July 21, 2007, armed robbery of the
Bank of Hanover, an armed robbery that netted Lake and his co-conspirators more than
$80,000; (3) conspiring to commit armed bank robberies; (4) being an accessory after the
fact to bank robbery; and (5) illegally possessing a firearms silencer. In his plea agreement,
the Appellant agreed to plead guilty to two offenses, Criminal Conspiracy to Commit
Armed Bank Robbery (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(a) and (d)) and Making and Failing to
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the validity of
a waiver de novo. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001).
2

Register a Firearm/Silencer (26 U.S.C. §§ 5822, 5861(f), 5871).
The Appellant’s plea agreement contained a detailed waiver-of-appeal provision,
which read as follows:
The defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code, Section
3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the conviction and sentence
imposed. Acknowledging all of this, the defendant knowingly waives the
right to appeal any conviction and sentence, including a sentence imposed
within the statutory maximum, on any and all grounds set forth in Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3742 or any other grounds, constitutional or
non-constitutional, including the manner in which that sentence was
determined . . . . The defendant also waives the defendant’s rights to
challenge any conviction or sentence or the manner in which the sentence
was determined in any collateral proceeding, including but not limited to a
motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255. The
defendant further acknowledges that this appeal waiver is binding only
upon the defendant, and that the United States retains its right to appeal in
this case.
App. 52a-53a.
The Appellant then re-affirmed the decision to waive his appellate rights at the
time of his guilty plea colloquy, stating three times under oath that he understood he was
forever waiving his right to appeal. App. 71a-72a. The District Court imposed a sentence
of 72 months imprisonment and this appeal followed.
II.
Defendants are entitled to waive constitutional and statutory rights, including the
right to appeal, provided that they do so knowingly and voluntarily. United States v.
Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 236-237 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the United States is entitled
to enforce appeal waivers like the waiver signed by the Appellant. In fact, this Court has
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upheld the enforceability of appeal waivers almost identical to the one signed by the
Appellant. See id. (upholding a waiver in which the defendant waived “any right ‘to
appeal any conviction and sentence, including a sentence imposed within the mandatory
minimum, on any and all grounds set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3742] or any other grounds,
constitutional or nonconstitutional’” and his “‘right to challenge any conviction or
sentence or the manner in which the sentence was determined in any collateral
proceeding, including but not limited to a motion brought under [28 U.S.C. § 2255]’”).
This Court will exercise its jurisdiction to review the merits of a waiver of appeal
even if we conclude that an appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to
appeal because we must still decide if the result would work a miscarriage of justice.
United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, there is no dispute that
the Appellant’s waiver was both knowing and voluntary. The written waiver was signed
both by the Appellant and by his counsel, who certified in writing that the Appellant’s
decision was a voluntary one. This voluntary choice was specifically addressed in the plea
colloquy, where, in the presence of counsel, the Appellant thrice advised the court that he
understood he was waiving his opportunity to appeal his sentence by pleading guilty
under the terms of the agreement. In addition, the Appellant’s counsel admits that the
waiver was knowing and voluntary in his brief before this Court. The only issue,
therefore, is whether or not upholding the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.
III.
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This Court utilizes a common sense approach in determining whether enforcing a
waiver of appeal would result in a miscarriage of justice. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 242 (citing
Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563) (“In the waiver context, we have adopted a common sense
approach in determining whether a miscarriage of justice would occur if the waiver were
enforced”). We look to several factors to make that determination, including: the clarity
of the error, its gravity, its character, the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact
of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant
acquiesced in the result. Id. at 242-243 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25-26
(1st Cir. 2001)).
The Appellant argues that the District Court erred in the sentencing process in two
ways. First, he contends that the District Court erred by denying him a reduction in
criminal history points for acceptance of responsibility because, although he did test
positive for cocaine four times after his arrest, the Appellant did eventually undertake
successful drug treatment. The Appellant argues that ultimately successful drug treatment
outweighs post-arrest drug use and, therefore, the District Court’s denial of a reduction in
criminal history points constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
Second, the Appellant argues that the District Court erred by applying a six-point
enhancement to his Guidelines offense level to reflect the fact that the actual robber (the
Appellant was only charged with Conspiracy to Commit Armed Bank Robbery) used a
firearm in the commission of the offense. He argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable
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that his co-conspirator would use a firearm during the armed bank robbery.
The Appellant cannot show that enforcement of his appeal waiver would work a
miscarriage of justice. First, the District Court did not err in denying the Appellant a
reduction in criminal history points for acceptance of responsibility. A district court’s
factual determinations under the Guidelines may only be disturbed on appeal if they are
clearly erroneous. Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v.
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). While on bail supervision, the Appellant tested
positive for cocaine use on four separate occasions, and twice failed to report for drug
testing as mandated by the conditions of his release. Three of these violations occurred
after the Appellant pled guilty. It is well settled that a district court has discretion to deny
acceptance of responsibility credit to a defendant who indulges in post-plea illegal drug
use. See United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129-130 (3d Cir. 1996). The District
Court had wide discretion in determining whether the Appellant was entitled to an
acceptance of responsibility reduction and did not stray beyond the permissible limits of
exercising that discretion.
Similarly, the District Court did not err in holding that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the armed bank robbery conspiracy would result in the use of a firearm.
It should be noted that the Appellant pled guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Armed Bank
Robbery. Defendants may be held accountable for the use of firearms by others in a
criminal conspiracy whenever that firearms use is “reasonably foreseeable.” U.S.S.G. §

6

1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Not only did the Appellant plead guilty to armed bank robbery, but the
very nature of the crime makes it reasonably foreseeable that a firearm would be utilized
in its commission.
Finally, the Appellant’s waiver reflects the informed give-and-take of plea
negotiations. In return for this waiver, the Appellant received several benefits under the
plea agreement. He was not convicted of armed robbery charges which carried more
severe statutory penalties, and he was able to earn a sentencing departure through his
truthful cooperation with the government. The sentence imposed on the appellant – 72
months imprisonment – fell more than four years below the minimum Guideline
imprisonment range initially calculated by the probation office. The mere assertion that
other members of the conspiracy received lower sentences or that the actual robber’s
sentence was only 38 months more, is not sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice.
*****
We have considered all contentions raised by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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